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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 In this case, UPS Worldwide Forwarding seeks to prevent 
the United States Postal Service from implementing a new service 
for customers that ship significant quantities of international 
mail.  In response, the Postal Service attacks UPS's standing to 
bring suit.  The district court determined that UPS had standing 
but that the Postal Service exceeded its authority in 
promulgating the new program.  We will reverse. 
I. 
 In July 1992, the Postal Service announced the 
creation, on an interim basis, of an International Customized 
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Mail ("ICM") service.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 30651 (1992).  Despite 
protests from UPS, a large delivery company that competes with 
the Postal Service, the Postal Service adopted the ICM program on 
a permanent basis in May 1993.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 29778 (1993). 
 Under the ICM service, qualifying international mailers 
negotiate individualized service agreements with the Postal 
Service to establish the kind of services to be provided and the 
rate of postage.  To qualify for the service, international 
mailers must be capable, on an annual basis, of mailing at least 
one million pounds of international mail or paying at least two 
million dollars in international postage.  Id. 
 Two months after publication of the permanent 
regulation, UPS filed suit in the District of Delaware, alleging 
the ICM service violated several provisions of the Postal 
Reorganization Act ("PRA"), Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 
(1970) (codified at 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-6440).  The Postal Service 
disagreed, claiming that its promulgation of the ICM regulation 
did not exceed its statutory authority.  The Postal Service also 
contended that UPS lacked standing to file the action.  Air 
Courier Conference of America/International Committee ("ACCA"), 
an unincorporated association of firms engaged in letter and 
parcel delivery services, then filed a motion to intervene. 
 Subsequently, the district court granted UPS's motion 
for summary judgment.  
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UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 853 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 
1994).  First, the court held that UPS had standing to challenge the Postal Service 
program.  Id. at 804.  Second, the court found the ICM service violated several sections 
of the PRA, codified at 39 U.S.C. §§101(d),0 403(b)-(c),0 and 407(a)0 (1988), and issued an 
injunction barring the Postal Service from operating the program. Id. at 804-07.  Finally, 
the court granted ACCA's motion to intervene.  Id. at 806-07.  The Postal Service 
appealed. 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1339 (1988) and 
39 U.S.C. § 409(a) (1988).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).  Our 
                     
0Section 101 provides statements of "Postal policy": 
 
. . . . 
 
(d)  Postal rates shall be established to apportion the costs of all 
postal operations to all users of the mail on a fair and equitable 
basis. 
0Section 403 provides the "[g]eneral duties" of the Postal Service: 
 
(b)  It shall be the responsibility of the Postal Service --  
 
. . . . 
 
(2) to provide types of mail service to meet the needs of 
different categories of mail and mail users . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
(c)  In providing services and in establishing classifications, rates, 
and fees under this title, the Postal Service shall not, except as 
specifically authorized in this title, make any undue or unreasonable 
discrimination among users of the mails, nor shall it grant any undue 
or unreasonable preferences to any such user. 
0Section 407 governs "[i]nternational postal arrangements": 
 
(a)  The Postal Service, with the consent of the President, may 
negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions, and may 
establish the rates of postage or other charges on mail matter 
conveyed between the United States and other countries.  The decisions 
of the Postal Service construing or interpreting the provisions of any 
treaty or convention which has been or may be negotiated and concluded 
shall, if approved by the President, be conclusive upon all officers 
of the Government of the United States. 
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review of these issues of standing and statutory construction is plenary.  See Polychrome 
Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5 F.3d 1522, 1530 n.19 (3d Cir. 1993) ("We have plenary review of 
the district court's judgment on standing."); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Fin. 
Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Our review of the construction of federal 
statutes is plenary."). 
II. 
 Before addressing standing and the merits, we consider the history of the 
statutory sections and regulations at the core of this dispute.  This review takes us back 
more than two hundred years. 
 In 1789, the First Congress established a Post Office and provided for the 
appointment of a Postmaster General.  See Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70; 
National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 
813 (1983).  Three years later, Congress approved a statute that "established basic mail 
rates, granted the Post Office Department a monopoly on mail delivery and authorized the 
creation of post roads."  See Joseph W. Belluck, Increasing Citizen Participation in U.S. 
Postal Service Policy Making, 42 Buff. L. Rev. 253, 257 (1994); see also Act of Feb. 20, 
1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232.  Under this Act, Congress set the rates not only for domestic 
mail, but also for letters and parcels sent abroad. Id. § 26, 1 Stat. at 239. 
 In 1825 and 1827, Congress passed laws prohibiting the private carriage of 
letters via stage, boat, horseback, or on foot, thereby "target[ing] transportation of 
mail which even then was contracted out to private carriers."  Air Courier Conference of 
America v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 526 (1991).  In the 1825 statute, 
Congress once again set the rate for domestic and international mail.  See Act of Mar. 3, 
1825, ch. 64, §§ 13, 34, 4 Stat. 102, 105, 112.   
 Despite the prohibitions on private carriers of mail, "high postal rates enabled 
private expresses to make substantial inroads into the domestic market for delivery of 
letters and the 1825 and 1827 Acts proved unsuccessful in prosecuting them."  Air Courier 
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Conference, 498 U.S. at 526.  In response, Congress passed a series of laws between 1845 
and 1851 reducing postage rates.  Belluck, supra, at 258.  Congress believed the 1845 Act, 
which strengthened the postal monopoly and reduced rates, "would have the dual virtues of 
driving private expresses out of business and increasing mail volume of the Post Office."  
Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 527 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 732).  The 
1851 Act continued the trend of reducing rates, but for the first time permitted those 
international rates set by Congress to be changed via "postal treaty or convention already 
concluded or hereafter to be made."  See Act. of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 20, § 1, 9 Stat. 587, 
588.  The Act also provided: 
[T]he Postmaster General, by and with the advice and consent of the 
President of the United States, shall be, and he hereby is, authorized 
to reduce or enlarge, from time to time, the rates of postage upon all 
letters and other mailable matter conveyed between the United States 
and any foreign country, for the purpose of making better postal 
arrangements with other governments, or counteracting any adverse 
measures affecting our postal intercourse with foreign countries . . . 
. 
Id. § 2, 9 Stat. at 589.  In 1872, Congress combined into one statutory section the 
authority of the Postmaster General to negotiate postal treaties and change international 
rates.  See Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 167, 17 Stat. 283, 304 ("[T]he Postmaster 
General, by and with the advice and consent of the President, may negotiate and conclude 
postal treaties or conventions, and may reduce or increase the rates of postage on mail 
matter conveyed between the United States and foreign countries.").   
 Although technology advanced rapidly over the next century, the organization of 
postal services remained largely unchanged.  Congress continued to set domestic mail 
rates, see 39 U.S.C. chs. 51-69 (1964), and the Postmaster General retained the authority 
to change international rates, with the advice and consent of the President.  Id. § 505.  
Congress also maintained the Post Office monopoly over mail delivery in an effort to keep 
revenues high and mailing costs low.  Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 527-28. 
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 By 1970, however, the Post Office "faced a major financial crisis" that resulted 
in significant backlogs of mail and postal worker strikes.  Belluck, supra, at 262, 265. 
Congress responded by passing the Postal Reorganization Act, an overhaul of the entire 
postal system that represented "a dramatic break with the past."  See Mail Order Ass'n of 
America v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also
No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3649, 3651-52.
 The PRA "abolished the Post Office Department, which since 1789 had administered 
the Nation's mails," and replaced it with the United States Postal Service, an independent 
agency within the executive branch.  National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers, 462 U.S. 
at 813.  The Act divested Congress of control over postal rates, id., with domestic rates 
set through a complex process involving the Postal Service, Postal Rate Commission, and 
Governors of the Postal Service, and international rates set by "[t]he Postal Service, 
with the consent of the President."  Air Courier Conference of America v. United States 
Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1216-23 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 407(a)).  
Congress also ordered the Postal Service to become self-sustaining, generating enough 
revenue to cover its expenses, thereby "launching 'the Postal Service into the commercial 
world.'"  Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 556 (1988) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v.
States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520 (1984)); see also H.R. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3665.  At the same time, the Act generally 
required fairness and forbade undue discrimination or preferences in the establishment of 
postal rates and services.  See 39 U.S.C. §§ 101(d), 403(c). 
 The PRA continued the Postal Service's statutory monopoly "over the carriage of 
letters in and from the United States," see Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 519 
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699 and 39 U.S.C. §§ 601-606), but it permitted the Postal 
Service to suspend its monopoly "where the public interest requires."  Id. (citing 39 
U.S.C. § 601(b)).  In 1979, the Postal Service suspended its monopoly over "extremely 
urgent letters" sent within the United States and abroad, thus allowing private couriers 
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such as UPS to compete with it in the overnight delivery of letters.  See id. (citing 39 
C.F.R. § 320.6).  In 1986, it went further by generally suspending its monopoly over mail 
sent abroad.  See id. at 519-20; see also 39 C.F.R. §320.8.0   
III. 
 Article III of the Constitution restricts the "judicial power" of the United 
States to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies."  See Valley Forge Christian 
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 
(1982).  Subsumed within this restriction is the requirement that "a litigant have 
'standing' to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit."  Id.  
Standing has constitutional and prudential components, both of which must be satisfied 
before a litigant may seek redress in the federal courts.  Id.; Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1994). 
A. 
 Earlier this year, the Supreme Court reiterated the three elements necessary to 
satisfy "the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing": 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury in fact' -- an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.  Second, there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must be likely, 
as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by 
a favorable decision. 
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). 
 In this case, there is no dispute that UPS meets the constitutional standing 
requirements.  First, as a competitor of the Postal Service with authority to compete in 
the international parcel delivery market,0 UPS stands to lose clientele lured to the 
                     
0Section 320.8 suspends the postal monopoly for "international remailing," which involves 
"bypassing the Postal Service and using private courier systems to deposit with foreign 
postal systems letters destined for foreign addresses."  Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. 
at 520. 
0See 39 C.F.R. §§ 320.6, 320.8 (1994); see also supra part II. 
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Postal Service by the ICM service.  Although UPS may not have demonstrated any lost 
business yet, the "injury in fact" component of standing merely requires that such injury 
be "imminent."  Id.; see also Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(noting that "threatened injury" suffices for Article III standing).  Second, the 
requisite "causal connection" between UPS's injuries and the Postal Service's conduct is 
clear; in fact, the Postal Service created the ICM program with the express purpose of 
"attract[ing] customers that currently use its competitors and [that] would not otherwise 
use the Postal Service for their international mailings.  If the Postal Service is 
successful, the additional volume will come from competitors, not from the Postal 
Service's other international services."  58 Fed. Reg. 29778, 29780.  Finally, a decision 
favorable to UPS will undoubtedly redress its injuries.  If we uphold the district court's 
decision for UPS, the Postal Service will not be able to implement the ICM service, and 
UPS cannot lose customers to a program that does not exist. 
B. 
 In addition to the Article III standing requirements, federal courts have 
developed prudential standing considerations "that are part of judicial self-government."  
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  These prudential standing rules 
require that: 
(1) a litigant "assert his [or her] own legal interests rather than 
those of third parties," (2) courts "refrain from adjudicating 
'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 
'generalized grievances,'" and (3) a litigant demonstrate that her 
interests are arguably within "the zone of interests" intended to be 
protected by the statute, rule or constitutional provision on which 
the claim is based.  
Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); 
also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).0 
                     
0Intervenor ACCA contends that the Postal Service has waived its right to object to 
prudential standing because of its notice in the Federal Register announcing the ICM 
service: 
11 
                                                                                          
 
Since the Postal Rate Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
challenge over international rates, the Postal Service's competitors 
cannot challenge ICM or any other international rates in that forum.  
However, the Postal Service's competitors can seek judicial review of 
ICM rates just like they can seek judicial review of other 
international rates. 
 
58 Fed. Reg. 29778, 29782 (1993). 
 
 Despite the Postal Service's statement inviting judicial review, it is uncertain 
whether prudential standing may be waived.  The Supreme Court has given mixed signals.  In 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-94 (1976), the Court hinted that the first prudential 
standing requirement -- which requires a party to assert its own rights, not the rights of 
others -- could be waived by a defendant.  See Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 52 n.1 (3d 
Cir.) (citing Craig for the proposition that "prudential standing [is] not 
jurisdictional"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 473 (1992); Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan
889 F.2d 124, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1989) (similarly citing Craig).  But, in later cases, the 
Supreme Court has indicated plaintiffs always must satisfy the prudential standing rules.  
In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986) (citing 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-18 (1975)), the Court stated: 
 
The rules of standing, whether as aspects of the Art. III case-or-
controversy requirement or as reflections of prudential considerations 
defining and limiting the role of the courts, are threshold 
determinants of the propriety of judicial intervention.  It is the 
responsibility of the complainant clearly to allege facts 
demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution 
of the dispute and the exercise of the court's remedial powers. 
 
Furthermore, recent Supreme Court opinions have held broadly that a party may never waive 
standing, but they have not expressly cited prudential standing.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) ("The question of standing is not subject to waiver 
. . . ."); National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 802 (1994) 
("Standing represents a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all 
stages of the litigation.").   
 
 From these cases, many of our sister circuits have determined that prudentia
standing cannot be waived.  See Community First Bank v. National Credit Union Admin.
F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir. 1994) ("We find no authority for the plaintiffs' argument that 
prudential standing requirements may be waived by the parties.  Recognizing a distinction 
between prudential and constitutional standing requirements in this context might give 
careless parties power to override congressional intent."); Animal Legal Defense Fund, 
Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 723 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Standing, whether constitutional or 
prudential, is a jurisdictional issue which cannot be waived or conceded."); Thompson v. 
County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
United States, 626 F.2d 917, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) ("[A]ppellee's purported waiver of 
prudential standing challenge is necessarily ineffective because standing implicates 
federal jurisdiction.").  At least one circuit has resolved the issue differently.  
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1. 
 The first step in satisfying prudential standing is for the litigant to 
demonstrate that it has asserted its "own legal interests rather than those of third 
parties."  Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474; Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).  The Postal Service alleges that UPS does not meet this 
first requirement because it has sued under provisions of the PRA that purportedly exist 
to protect users of the mail, not competitors:  "Because plaintiff does not claim to be 
injured as a mailer, it may not challenge alleged violations of statutory provisions that 
protect mailers from undue discrimination."  Appellant's Brf. at 14. 
 We believe the Postal Service confuses this first element of prudential 
standing, that plaintiff assert its own rights, with the third element, that plaintiff's 
complaint be within the "zone of interests" the statute was designed to protect or 
regulate.  See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1278, 1283 (1995).  Under the zone of interests 
                                                                                          
Lindley for Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Because the 
Secretary failed to suggest in the district court that prudential considerations should 
bar David from suing on his parents' behalf, we cannot consider these arguments here.").
 
 Our jurisprudence has not decisively settled the matter.  Recently, we raised 
the matter of constitutional and prudential standing, even when the parties agreed that 
standing existed.  See Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 537 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citation omitted) ("[W]e have an independent obligation to consider jurisdictional 
issues, and 'the doctrine of standing . . . goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
district court and the validity of its judgment ab initio.'"); see also Bennun v. Rutgers 
State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 168 (3d Cir. 1991) (referring to "those constitutional and 
prudential [standing] limitations that restrict a court's power to act and so must be 
resolved before we can proceed further on the merits"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1066 
(1992).  But in Elkin, 969 F.2d at 52 n.1, while defendants did not challenge plaintiff's 
standing, we analyzed the issue because of our "independent obligation to ensure that 
federal jurisdiction is present in cases that come before us."  Although we found that 
plaintiff satisfied the Article III standing requirements, we declined to decide whether 
he satisfied the prudential rules.  Id.; see also Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential 
Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1992) ("We find it unnecessary to decide the 
so-called standing issue which would, at best, only involve prudential standing.").
 
 Because we determine that UPS has standing here, we need not resolve the issue 
of whether prudential standing may be waived. 
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test, a plaintiff must demonstrate the "interest he seeks to vindicate is arguably within 
the 'zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute' in question."  
(citations omitted); see also infra part III.B.3.  The first element only mandates that 
litigants assert their own legal rights, not those of others.  Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538.  
This test generally comes into play in those cases in which a party seeks to challenge 
agency action that affects another party.  See, e.g., id. at 539 (holding that plaintiff 
"fails to satisfy the prudential requirements for standing because she improperly is 
seeking to vindicate the rights of a third-party, the United States"). 
 In this case, as we have noted, the Postal Service has granted UPS and other 
delivery companies the right to compete in the delivery of international mail.  See
C.F.R. §§ 320.6, 320.8 (1994); see also supra part II.  If the ICM service is permitted, 
UPS alleges it would be injured in the exercise of its right to deliver such mail, a point 
the Postal Service has not contested on appeal.  Therefore, we believe UPS is properly 
asserting its "own legal interests."  Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 538. 
2. 
 The second prudential standing consideration admonishes courts to "refrain from 
adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized 
grievances.'" Id.  For example, the Supreme Court has denied standing, inter alia, in 
cases in which plaintiffs sued to protest the Vietnam War, see Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974) ("[S]tanding to sue may not be predicated 
upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is held in common by all members of the 
public . . . ."); or to challenge the legality of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (citation omitted) (rejecting 
plaintiff's attempt to "employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized 
grievances about the conduct of government").  We hold that this dispute is not the type 
of "generalized grievance" that poses a barrier to standing. 
3. 
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 Finally, litigants must demonstrate their interests fall "arguably within the 
'zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute' in question."  See 
News Shipbuilding, 115 S. Ct. at 1283 (citations omitted); see also Wheeler, 22 F.3d at 
538.  This element represents the primary focus of the parties' dispute over standing.
 In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp., 397 U.S. 
150, 153 (1970), the Supreme Court formulated the "zone of interests" element of standing.  
In Data Processing, sellers of data processing services challenged a Comptroller of the 
Currency ruling that permitted national banks to offer data processing services to their 
customers.  Plaintiffs contested the ruling as contrary to a statute barring bank service 
corporations from engaging in "any activity other than the performance of bank services 
for banks." Id. at 155 (citation omitted).  The Supreme Court found plaintiffs had 
standing because their interests were within the "zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."  Id. at 153.0   
 Similarly, in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987), the 
Court held a trade association of securities brokers had standing to challenge a decision 
by the Comptroller that national banks could operate discount brokerage services in 
locations outside of their home states.  Id. at 394-403.  The Comptroller claimed the 
trade association did not have standing because it was not within the "zone of interests" 
of the McFadden Act, which limited national banks to conducting general business in their 
home states.  But the Court held it was essential to consider the "zone of interests" of 
both the McFadden Act and the National Bank Act, which the McFadden Act had amended.  The 
Court stated, "As Data Processing demonstrates, we are not limited to considering the 
statute under which respondents sued, but may consider any provision that helps us to 
                     
0See also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 621 (1971) (holding that association 
of investment companies had standing to challenge regulation authorizing banks to operate 
collective investment funds); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (holding 
that travel agents had standing to challenge decision to allow banks to provide travel 
services to their customers). 
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understand Congress' overall purposes in the National Bank Act."  Id. at 401. Furthermore
as in prior cases, the Court held that "competitors who allege an injury that implicates 
the policies of the National Bank Act are very reasonable candidates to seek review of the 
Comptroller's rulings."  Id. at 403. 
 Although Clarke noted the zone of interests "test is not meant to be especially 
demanding; in particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit 
the would-be plaintiff," id. at 399-400 (footnote omitted), recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence suggests a somewhat stricter test.  See, e.g., Chem Serv., Inc. v. 
Environmental Monitoring Sys. Lab., 12 F.3d 1256, 1262 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Most recently, the 
Court has taken a stricter view of what statute or statutes should be considered as 
'relevant' for the purpose of applying the zone of interest test.").  The prominent 
example of this stricter approach is Air Courier Conference of America v. American Postal 
Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991). 
 In Air Courier Conference, unions representing postal workers challenged a 
Postal Service regulation that suspended the postal monopoly to permit "international 
remailing," the practice of "bypassing the Postal Service and using private courier 
systems to deposit with foreign postal systems letters destined for foreign addresses."  
Id. at 520.  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had found standing 
because the PRA, the statute also at issue in this case, provided protections for workers 
while recodifying the Private Express Statutes ("PES"), which governed the postal mo
over mail delivery. Thus, the D.C. Circuit concluded, the employees' interests were within 
the "zone of interests" of the PRA.  Id. at 521-22. 
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals had erred in 
looking at the entire PRA in applying the "zone of interests" test.  The Court stated:
The only relationship between the PES, upon which the Unions rely for 
their claim on the merits, and the labor-management provisions of the 
PRA, upon which the Unions rely for their standing, is that both were 
included in the general codification of postal statutes embraced in 
the PRA.  The statutory provisions enacted and reenacted in the PRA 
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are spread over some 65 pages in the United States Code and take up an 
entire title of that volume.  We said in Lujan that "the relevant 
statute [under the APA] of course, is the statute whose violation is 
the gravamen of the complaint."  To adopt the unions' contention would 
require us to hold that the "relevant statute" in this case is the 
PRA, with all of its various provisions united only by the fact that 
they deal with the Postal Service. But to accept this level of 
generality in defining the "relevant statute" could deprive the zone-
of-interests test of virtually all meaning. 
 
 Unlike the two sections of the National Bank Act discussed in 
Clarke, supra, none of the provisions of the PES have any integral 
relationship with the labor-management provisions of the PRA. 
Id. at 529-30 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990) 
(citation omitted)).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held the unions lacked standing to 
bring their claim.0 
 The Postal Service contends that Air Courier Conference dictates that UPS be 
denied standing in this case. 0  It alleges the purposes behind the PRA sections 
involved here, 39 U.S.C. §§101(d), 403(b)-(c), and 407(a),0 were not to protect 
competitors of the Postal Service.  Instead, the Postal Service claims that §§ 101(d) and 
403(b)-(c), which generally require fairness in establishing postal rates, were intended
to protect mailers. Furthermore, the Postal Service argues that § 407(a) was meant to 
protect the president's foreign policy authority, not the interests of private Postal 
                     
0Under 39 U.S.C. § 410(a), the Postal Service is not covered by chapters 5 and 7 of Title 
5, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act that involve "Administrative 
Procedure" and "Judicial Review."  In Air Courier Conference, the Supreme Court declined 
to determine whether § 410(a) exempts the Postal Service from judicial review under the 
APA, holding that the Postal Service had waived the issue.  498 U.S. at 522-23 & 523 n.3.  
But see id. at 531-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Similarly, although the Postal Service 
briefly mentions the issue in a footnote, see Appellant's Brf. at 11 n.3, it states it is 
"content" to have this case judged under the "zone of interests" test.  See Appellant's
Reply Brf. at 3 n.1.  Thus, we consider the matter waived. 
0In Air Courier Conference, the trade association ACCA intervened on behalf of the Postal 
Service and argued the unions lacked standing, leaving the Postal Service only a 
"nominal[]" litigant.  498 U.S. at 520, 522.  Ironically, the Postal Service in this case 
is attempting to use that decision against ACCA so as to deny it the right to intervene 
and UPS the right to litigate.  
0For the text of these sections, see supra notes 1-3. 
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Service competitors.  Thus, the Postal Service asserts, UPS should be denied standi
here. 
 We believe the Postal Service misconstrues the lessons of Air Courier Conference
and its predecessors.  These cases do not require that plaintiffs be among the intended 
beneficiaries of the statute under which they are suing.  See, e.g., Clarke, 479 U.S. at 
399-400 (requiring "no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be 
plaintiff"); Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1995) ("The [zone of 
interests] test, however, is not so stringent that it requires the would-be plaintiff to 
be specifically targeted by Congress as a beneficiary of the statute.").  Even Air Courier 
Conference merely required an "integral relationship" between the statutory provisions 
plaintiffs claim have been violated and the provisions under which plaintiffs claim 
standing.  Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 530 (noting that "none of the provisions of 
the PES have any integral relationship with the labor-management provisions of the PRA");
see also Chem Serv., Inc., 12 F.3d at 1264-65 (upholding standing where statutes found to 
have an "integral relationship" with each other (quoting Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. 
at 530)). 
 In this case, we believe an "integral relationship" exists among the relevant 
statutory provisions.  Sections 101(d), 403(b)-(c), and 407(a) provide procedures for the 
manner in which postal rates may be adopted and the types of rates that will and will not 
be permitted.  As we noted supra in part II, the history of the Postal Service 
                     
0In view of the "integral relationship" language, we do not interpret Air Courier 
Conference as establishing a strict zone of interests test contrary to previous Supreme 
Court precedent, such as Clarke, where the Court stated that the zone of interests "test 
is not meant to be especially demanding."  479 U.S. at 399. Air Courier Conference, we 
note, merely held that a recodification of an entire title of the United States Code, 
covering hundreds of statutory provisions developed over the course of two centuries, did 
not constitute one "statute," within the meaning of the zone of interests test.  See
Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 529-30 ("The statutory provisions enacted and reenacted in 
the PRA are spread over some 65 pages in the United States Code and take up an enti
title of that volume. . . .  [T]o accept this level of generality in defining the 
'relevant statute' could deprive the zone-of-interests test of virtually all meaning.").
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demonstrates that Congress understood that statutes setting postal rates were inextricably 
linked with those governing the postal monopoly.  See Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 
526-27 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1845, 5 Stat. 732).  Both types of statutes were intended to 
affect competitors.  See id.   
 In fact, in Air Courier Conference, the Supreme Court recognized that 
competitors fall within the zone of interests of the postal monopoly statutes.  See
528 n.5 ("The PES are competition statutes that regulate the conduct of competitors of t
Postal Service.  The postal employees for whose benefit the Unions have brought suit here 
are not competitors of either the Postal Service or remailers.").  Although the Supreme 
Court noted that "[e]mployees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition 
laws because they lack competitive and direct injury," id., it reiterated that 
"competitors of regulated entities have standing to challenge regulations."  Id. at 529. 
In this case, it is undisputed that UPS is a competitor of the Postal Service.  Because 
the regulation at issue involves Postal Service rate-making -- a fundamental means of 
affecting competition, as we noted supra in part II -- UPS has standing to challenge it.  
Such standing is all the more clear in cases, like this one, where the agency that is 
promulgating the regulation is also the "competitor" whose interests are being advanced.
 These statutes, governing the postal monopoly and postal rate-making, are on a 
different footing than the labor-management provisions under which plaintiffs claimed 
standing in Air Courier Conference.  Those labor provisions were a new feature of the 1970 
Act, unrelated to the postal monopoly provisions that had existed for more than a century. 
See Air Courier Conference, 498 U.S. at 524-28.  But as we have noted, the relationship 
between the postal monopoly and rate-making rules -- and their effect on competitors 
has existed for most of the two-hundred year history of the postal statutes.  See supra
part II.   
 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has recognized competitors have an interest 
in enforcing the postal monopoly statutes, Congress has provided that competitors are 
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within the "zone of interests" of the postal rate-making statutes.  The PRA expressly 
requires that the Postal Rate Commission, in recommending rates, consider the effect of 
increases on, inter alia, "enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the 
delivery of mail matter other than letters."  39 U.S.C. §3622(b)(4).  The same section 
also requires the Commission to consider the "policies of this title," thereby 
incorporating the statements of "[p]ostal policy" of § 101, which is one of the provisions 
under which UPS has filed suit.  Thus, we believe competitors such as UPS fall within the 
"zone of interests" of these rate-making statutes.   
 In fact, we believe the Postal Service has largely conceded the issue.  In its 
brief, the Postal Service admitted that competitors would have standing to sue under §§ 
101 and 403 if they alleged that the rates set were a "predatory attempt to destroy 
competition."  See Appellant's Brf. at 16.  In conceding standing in this context, the 
Postal Service necessarily admits that protecting competitors from economic injury caused 
by illegal regulations falls within the zone of interests of these statutory provisions.  
We fail to see why competitors would be within the zone of interests if §§ 101 and 403 
were violated by the Postal Service's predatory rate pricing but not if the same 
provisions were violated by the Postal Service's establishment of unfair or inequitable 
rates. 
 In evaluating the PRA's rate-making provisions, it appears that Congress was 
concerned with balancing certain societal interests: those of government, various 
categories of mailers, and private competitors.  Recently we faced a similar situation in 
Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1995), in which a drug manufacturer challenged 
the FDA's approval of a regulation that permitted its competitors, manufacturers of 
generic drugs, to use an abbreviated application procedure.  In affirming the drug 
manufacturer's standing, we recognized the relevant Act "reflect[ed] a statutory 
compromise of the competing concerns" of the public and of various drug manufacturers.  
Id. at 396 (citation omitted).  Similarly, we view the sections of the PRA governing 
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postal rates as striking a balance between competing concerns.  Although we understand a 
fundamental purpose of the PRA was to make the Postal Service more competitive, we note 
that Congress also expressed some concern for private competitors of the Postal Service.  
See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. §3622(b)(4).  Accordingly, we hold that UPS falls within the "zone of 
interests" of these statutory provisions generally governing postal rates.0 
IV. 
 Turning to the merits, we address the district court's holding that the Postal 
Service's promulgation of the regulation establishing the ICM service violated several 
provisions of the PRA.  See 
                     
0For the same reasons we hold UPS to have standing, we find that ACCA has standing to 
intervene in this case. 
UPS Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 853 F. Supp. 800, 804
Del. 1994).  To understand these provisions, it is necessary to consider the framework of 
the rate-making sections of the PRA and how the ICM service fits within this statutory 
scheme. 
A. 
 As we have noted, a fundamental change wrought by the PRA was to transfer
making authority from Congress to the Postal Service and related agencies.  See supra
II.  For domestic rates, the PRA established a complex process whereby the Postal Service 
proposes rates, the Postal Rate Commission considers the proposals and offers its 
recommendations, and the Governors of the Postal Service act on the recommendations.  
Air Courier Conference of America v. United States Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1216 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing various provisions of the PRA).  In making its recommendations, the 
Commission is instructed to consider numerous factors listed in the PRA, 39 U.S.C. § 
3622(b), and it must conduct a hearing to allow the Postal Service and public to testify.  
Id. § 3624.  For certain types of mail, such as the different classes of mail for letters, 
the Postal Service must establish a rate that is "uniform throughout the United States, 
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its territories, and possessions." Id. § 3623(d); see also id. § 3683 (prescribing 
"[u]niform rates for books; films; other materials"). 
 In contrast to the domestic rate-making procedure, the PRA's international rate
making rules are a model of simplicity. The PRA provides: 
 The Postal Service, with the consent of the President, may 
negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions, and may 
establish the rates of postage or other charges on mail matter 
conveyed between the United States and other countries. 
39 U.S.C. § 407(a).  No proposals need be made and considered by other bodies, no public 
hearings held, and no specific criteria considered.  Instead, the Postal Service need only 
"establish" international rates, with the President's consent.  We believe the differences 
between the domestic and international rate-making procedures demonstrate that Congress 
intended the Postal Service to have significant authority and flexibility in establishing 
the rates for mail sent abroad. 
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B. 
 Pursuant to the PRA statutory scheme, the Postal Service promulgated the ICM 
service for international mailers. See 58 Fed. Reg. 29778 (1993).  In publishing its 
interim regulation, the Postal Service offered two primary reasons for the ICM service.  
First, it explained that other countries have adopted varying charges on mail sent from 
the United States, with some based on weight and others on volume.  A uniform price for 
overseas mail, particularly for large-volume customers, meant that "some customers face[d] 
published rates disproportionate to the costs that the Postal Service would incur in 
providing those customers with the services in question . . . ."  57 Fed. Reg. 30651, 
30652 (1992).  The Postal Service explained: 
Until relatively recently, the most significant components of the 
costs incurred by the Postal Service in connection with its 
international operations, namely transportation expenses and the 
charges imposed by foreign postal administrations to deliver U.S.-
origin mail (terminal dues), were based exclusively on weight.  
Although transportation expenses are still a function of weight, the 
postal administrations of countries to which much U.S. mail is sent 
have implemented terminal dues arrangements that recognize that mail 
processing costs vary by volume as well as by weight. Moreover, the 
Postal Service currently is charged terminal dues by foreign postal 
administrations using four different methods of calculation.  
Consequently, the Postal Service incurs substantially different costs 
for delivering mail to different countries. Due to uniform pricing, 
however, the Postal Service's rates do not reflect country-specific 
costs to the extent possible. Similarly, uniform rates do not 
generally take into account differences in how mail is prepared or 
where it is tendered, both of which can significantly affect costs. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 Second, because of the regulation permitting private couriers to deliver 
international mail, the Postal Service faced increasing competition from companies 
attempting to lure mailers by "implementing flexible rate structures and customer-specific 
service offerings."  Id.  The Postal Service noted: 
 This flexibility enables the Postal Service's competitors to 
tailor service features to individual customers and to price those 
features on a partially or completely disaggregated basis.  In 
contrast, traditional Postal Service pricing policies and practices, 
whereby the Postal Service generally treats all current and potential 
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customers identically and uses averaged costs when setting rates, are 
not designed to deal with a competitive environment.  The expanded 
alternatives available to customers and the improved attractiveness of 
those alternatives have made it increasingly difficult for the Postal 
Service to sell its services to a varied group of customers using a 
single published schedule of rates.  To the extent that uniform 
pricing prevents the Postal Service from attracting new customers and 
keeping existing customers, all of the Postal Service's other users 
suffer by having to pay more for their postal services. 
Id. 
 Despite its reasons for implementing the program, the Postal Service determined 
that it would not be feasible to offer ICM service to everyone "regardless of size or 
mailing patterns." Id. at 30653.  The Postal Service estimated substantial costs to 
negotiate and implement the ICM agreements; expenses were high enough so that "for all but 
the largest volume customers, those costs in many instances could be greater" than the 
Postal Service earned from the ICM program.  Id.  Furthermore, the Postal Service expected 
to benefit from economies of scale generated by large-volume customers that would not 
occur with smaller mailers. As it noted, "[I]ncreased volumes amplify the beneficial 
effects of flexible pricing."  Id.  Because ICM agreements vary depending upon the level 
of services required by individual customers, ICM rates may be higher, lower, or the same
as ordinary public rates. 
C. 
 Despite the flexibility accorded the Postal Service in the international arena, 
see supra part IV.A, the PRA contains several general statements of policy, duties, and 
powers -- such as prohibitions on discrimination and requirements of fairness --that serve 
as additional limitations on both domestic and international rates.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 
30651, 30652 (1992) (listing, inter alia, §§ 101(d) and 403(c) as restricting rates). It 
is these general statutory statements of "policy" and "duties" on which UPS relies in 
attacking the ICM program.  We will consider each of these sections in turn.   
1. 
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 Section 101 opens the PRA, outlining general statements of "Postal policy."  
Subsection (d) provides: "Postal rates shall be established to apportion the costs of all 
postal operations to all users of the mail on a fair and equitable basis."  A similar 
general requirement is contained in § 403(c), which lists the "[g]eneral duties" of the 
Postal Service: 
 In providing services and in establishing classifications, rates, 
and fees under this title, the Postal Service shall not, except as 
specifically authorized in this title, make any undue or unreasonable 
discrimination among users of the mails, nor shall it grant any undue 
or unreasonable preferences to any such user. 
   The district court found the ICM service violated these provisions because, to 
qualify for the program, customers must be capable of mailing one million pounds of 
international mail or paying two million dollars in international postage per year, but 
they need not actually mail or pay any specified amounts.  See 58 Fed. Reg. 29778.  The 
district court stated: 
Under the ICM system, small-volume mailers who are not able to meet 
the threshold capacity requirements of the ICM agreements are not able 
to gain the benefit of an individually negotiated, lower rate.  The 
costs are not apportioned fairly, because under the ICM, there is no 
requirement that the large-volume mailer actually deliver more than 
the small-volume mailer. 
UPS Worldwide Forwarding, 853 F. Supp. at 805.  The court found this set of circumstances 
discriminated unreasonably against small-volume mailers.  Id.  In so holding, the court 
stated that "[s]eemingly, there is no reasonable explanation as to why the Postal Service 
uses capability as a criteria rather than actual performance."  Id.  We disagree. 
 We believe the Postal Service has offered a reasonable explanation for its 
business decision to require that mailers be "capable" of tendering a certain threshold 
amount of mail, rather than mandating that potential customers agree up front to actually 
tender that minimum.  As counsel explained at oral argument: 
To require a commitment would just sort of drive [potential customers] 
off.  I mean, if you say we are not giving you this business until you 
commit to it, then you never get the business. 
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 It is better to make them the offer, get them to try the 
business, and then in practice my client informs me, once you get the 
business of a big company, you tend to get all its business. 
Tr. at 44-45.  We believe this provides a logical and reasonable explanation for the 
Postal Service's business decision.  UPS does not contend the Postal Service's explanation 
fails to pass muster in an economic sense; it merely argues the Postal Service does not 
have the authority to make such business judgments.  But Congress repeatedly indicated 
that a primary purpose underlying the PRA was to require the Postal Service to discard its 
system of political patronage and bureaucratic decision-making in favor of modern business 
practices.  See infra part IV.D.  We see nothing in the PRA that prevents the Postal 
Service from innovative attempts to increase its business and profits, as long as it stays 
within the bounds of the relevant statutes. 
 As we have noted, § 101(d) provides that "[p]ostal rates shall be established to 
apportion the costs of all postal operations to all users of the mail on a fair and 
equitable basis."  The determination whether a particular rate is "fair" or "equitable"
not capable of precise definition, but we do not view the ICM service as unfair or 
inequitable.  The program may benefit large-volume mailers over their smaller counterparts 
because of economies of scale.  That the Postal Service chose to offer the program to 
those "capable" of tendering a certain minimum level of mail or dollars, instead of those 
that actually so deliver, reflects a reasonable business decision about the most effective 
means to solicit new customers. 
 Similarly, we do not view the ICM service as violative of § 403(c)'s ban on 
"undue or unreasonable discrimination" or "undue or unreasonable preferences."  We cannot 
ignore that the "undue or unreasonable" language, twice repeated in § 403(c), means that 
reasonable discrimination and preferences among users of the mail are permitted.  Allowing 
a limited class -- the relatively small percentage of large-volume mailers eligible to 
participate in the ICM program -- to negotiate individual service plans at individual 
rates does not appear on its face to be "undue or unreasonable."  As we have noted, it 
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permits the Postal Service to compete more effectively for the business of large-volume 
mailers, see supra part IV.B, fulfilling congressional intent.  See infra part IV.D.
 As with the terms "fair" and "equitable" in § 101(d), we find it difficult to 
define the contours of what constitutes "undue or unreasonable" discrimination or 
preferences.  We note that other courts, when confronting this section, have accorded 
postal authorities broad latitude.  In Mail Order Ass'n of America v. United States Postal 
Service, 2 F.3d 408, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993), magazine publishers challenged the Postal Rate 
Commission's decision not to adopt a "zoned" second-class mail rate, i.e., a rate that 
would increase with distance.  Because the Commission's decision had not violated any 
specific rate provision of the PRA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
reasoned that:  
The question, then, is whether the Commission was arbitrary in its 
ultimate trade-off between the cost considerations that pointed toward 
zoning, and the competing values that it ultimately favored.  Any such 
arbitrariness would presumably violate 39 U.S.C. § 403(c)'s 
prohibition of "undue or unreasonable preferences." 
Id. at 435-36.  The court noted that "[t]he refusal to zone indeed appears unsupported by 
any cost principle."  Id. at 436. Nevertheless, the court ultimately held that, because 
the Commission had valid reasons for its decision, it had not violated § 403(c).  Id.
437.0  Similarly, as we noted supra in part IV.B., the Postal Service had equally valid 
reasons for its decision to create the ICM service. 
                     
0It is instructive that the Universal Postal Union, the United Nations agency governing 
international mail, permits postal authorities to "give preferential rates to major users 
of the Post."  See 58 Fed. Reg. 29778 (citing UPU Convention, art. 20, ¶ 15). 
0Other courts have reached similar conclusions.  In Aimes Publications, Inc. v. United 
States Postal Service, Civ. A. No. 86-1434, 1988 WL 19618, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 1988), 
the court noted the Postal Service's enforcement of its second-class statutory rules 
apparently was "at best, uneven," but it found no violation of § 403(c).  The court stated 
that "[t]ypically, the court[s] have given the Postal Service broad discretion in 
administering the classification scheme, which necessitates differentiating among users."  
Id. at *7 n.13.  And in Egger v. United States Postal Service, 436 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Va. 
1977), a student challenged a Postal Service policy that provided a different level of 
service to single students living in university housing than that provided for married 
students.  In upholding the different service levels, the court noted: 
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 On its face, then, we believe the ICM service does not violate § 403(c).  The 
regulation promulgating the ICM program requires the Postal Service to "make every ICM 
service agreement available to similarly situated customers under substantially similar 
circumstances and conditions."  See 58 Fed. Reg. 29782. To facilitate that process, the 
regulation mandates that the Postal Service publish detailed information about each ICM 
agreement, including the term, rate, type of mail involved, destination country or 
countries, minimum volume commitments, and descriptions of services to be provided by the 
Postal Service and mailer.  Id.  We believe the publication of this information will 
permit competitors and mailers alike to verify that the Postal Service is complying with 
its mandate not to grant "undue or unreasonable" discrimination or preferences.  
2. 
 As we have noted, § 403 provides the "[g]eneral duties" of the Postal Service.  
Subsection (b)(2) provides: "It shall be the responsibility of the Postal Service to 
provide types of mail service to meet the needs of different categories of mail and mail 
                                                                                          
While it is obvious that [§ 403(c)] prohibits undue or unreasonable 
discrimination among users in the provision of delivery services, it 
is also equally obvious that the Postal Service may provide different 
levels of delivery service to different groups of mail users so long 
as the distinctions are reasonable.  The goal sought by the Postal 
Service in the instant case by their discrimination is the efficient 
and economical delivery of the mail.  The goal is legitimate and the 
only question before the court is whether the distinctions between the 
three groups are rationally related to the achievement of the goal. 
 
Id. at 142; see also Time, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 710 F.2d 34, 41 n.8 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (holding that the disparities between the contribution to the Postal Service's 
fixed costs from each class of mail service "are not so great as to amount to 'undue or 
unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails'"); Direct Mail/Mktg. Ass'n, Inc. v. 
United States Postal Serv., 501 F.2d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding temporary rate 
changes that allegedly discriminated against third-class mailers in violation of § 403(c) 
because the Postal Service action was "manifestly reasonable"); Ludewig v. Wolff, 492 F. 
Supp. 1048, 1049 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (finding no violation of §403(c) "because the 
distinctions made by the regulations are reasonably related to the effectuation of the 
pertinent objectives of the Postal Reorganization Act"). 
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users."  The district court held the ICM program violated §403(b)(2) because it serves 
"individual" users, not "categories" of users.  
UPS Worldwide Forwarding, 853 F. Supp. at 804-05.  We disagree. 
 The ICM program is open to those customers capable of tendering one million 
pounds of international mail or paying two million dollars in international postage.  We 
consider that group of customers to be a "category" of mail users, and believe the Postal 
Service is providing "mail service to meet the needs" of that category of users by 
offering them the ability to negotiate individualized service plans to meet individual 
needs.  Section 403(b) does not specify that, to meet the needs of a category of users, 
the Postal Service must give them all the same rate.  In fact, the Postal Service may 
better "meet the needs" of large-volume mailers by offering them individualized service 
plans at individual rates. 
 But UPS contends that § 403(b)(2) generally prohibits individually-negotiated 
rates.  Once again, we disagree.  As we have noted, § 403(c) bars "undue or unreasonable" 
discrimination and preferences.  That necessarily means that reasonable discrimination and 
preferences are permitted.  See supra part IV.C.1.  Furthermore, the various domestic mail 
provisions that require "uniform" rates demonstrate that Congress knew how to mandate 
uniformity and equality when it desired.  See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (requiring that 
rates for each class of letter mail be "uniform throughout the United States, its 
territories, and possessions"); id. § 3683 (prescribing "[u]niform rates for books; films; 
other materials"). 
 Finally, we fail to understand how the statement of "[g]eneral duties" of the 
Postal Service could forbid the ICM program.  Instead of a restriction on the powers of 
the Postal Service, it merely enumerates, as its title indicates, the Service's "[g]eneral 
duties."  Viewing the statutory scheme overall, § 403 was intended to list "[g]eneral 
duties," while other sections of the PRA specified duties, powers, and limitations.  There 
is nothing in this section that bars the Postal Service from doing more than the minimum 
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required here. Thus, as long as the Postal Service provides service to "meet the needs of 
different categories of mail and mail users," it also may provide individualized service.  
See, e.g., 39 C.F.R. §3001.68, App. A, ¶ 500.021 (describing the Postal Service's 
established "Custom Designed Service," in which customers negotiate with the Postal 
Service for specialized pick-up and delivery arrangements). 
3. 
 Section 407(a), governing "[i]nternational postal arrangements," provides that 
"[t]he Postal Service, with the consent of the President, may negotiate and conclude 
postal treaties or conventions, and may establish the rates of postage or other charges on 
mail matter conveyed between the United States and other countries."  The district court 
held § 407(a) requires the President to consent to new international postal rates.  
Worldwide Forwarding, 853 F. Supp. at 806.  On appeal, neither party disputes this 
holding.  But UPS makes two arguments under § 407(a). 
a. 
 UPS contends the ICM service is prohibited by the phrase, "establish the rates 
of postage or other charges."  UPS claims that "establish" means to "set up . . . 
permanently" and "rates" are "standardized prices made available to the public at large."  
Appellee's Brf. at 25 (citations omitted).  Thus, UPS asserts, § 407(a) does not permit 
the individual rates found in the ICM service.  We disagree.  If "establish" means 
creating permanent rates, the Postal Service could never change its rates. We do not 
believe Congress intended that result.  Furthermore, the word "rates" may well indicate, 
as UPS claims, "standardized prices available to the public at large," but § 407(a) allows 
the Postal Service to "establish the rates of postage or other charges" (emphasis added).  
We believe the negotiated rates of the ICM service satisfy the latter part of the phrase, 
if not the former. 
b. 
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 UPS also alleges the President never manifested the requisite consent under § 
407(a).  The Postal Service responds that the President consented by allowing the rates to 
take effect without objection.  Because it is clear that the President never formally 
consented to the adoption of the ICM service, we must consider the historical practice 
under the statute.  
 As we noted, Congress enacted legislation in 1851 permitting the Postmaster 
General, "by and with the consent of the President," to change the international postal 
rates set by Congress.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 20, § 2, 9 Stat. 587, 588; see
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 167, 17 Stat. 283, 304.  The statute remained essentially 
the same until 1970, when the PRA permitted the "Postal Service, with the consent of the 
President," to "establish" those rates.   
 Neither party has submitted any evidence that, from the adoption of the 1851 
Act, the President ever has affirmatively manifested, by word or deed, his consent to 
changes in international rates.  The Postal Service notes that international rates have 
changed at least sixty times since 1945, all without express presidential approval.  
Aff. of John F. Alepa, Manager of Pricing, U.S. Postal Service, App. at 55-62; cf. 
Courier Conference of America v. United States Postal Serv., 959 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (3d 
Cir. 1992) ("Before the [PRA] was passed, international rates had been set by the 
Postmaster General's administrative fiat . . . .").  Thus, the undisputed historical 
record indicates the President and postal authorities have long interpreted § 407(a) as 
not requiring the affirmative consent of the President.  
 In its brief, UPS argues the Postal Service has offered no evidence that the 
President agrees with its interpretation of the § 407(a) consent provision.  See 
Appellee's Brf. at 41-42. But after submission of UPS's brief, the President published a 
memorandum in the Federal Register, delegating until completion of this appeal his 
authority under § 407(a) to establish postage rates.  59 Fed. Reg. 65471 (1994).  The 
memorandum provides: 
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[T]he Government argues that the explicit consent of the President is 
not required.  In the view of the Government, to the extent that 39 
U.S.C. 407(a) does require the President to consent, it does not 
require that consent be given in any particular manner.  The 
Government's position is that the failure of the President to object 
to the establishment of international postage rates and other charges 
is consent to the establishment of such rates and other charges.  This 
has been the practice of the Government for the past 120 years. 
Id. 
 Nevertheless, after viewing the unique history of the application of § 407(a), 
we believe the President has demonstrated how he has manifested his consent to action by 
the Postal Service.  We decline UPS's invitation to prescribe certain procedural steps the 
President must take in this regard. Although such guidance might be necessary with 
different statutes, agencies, or branches of government, we believe it is inappropriate in 
this context.  Although the President and the Postal Service now agree he may consent to 
international postal rate changes merely by not objecting, we rely only on the historical 
practice under § 407(a) in upholding the ICM service.0 
D. 
 In challenging the Postal Service, its competitors characterize it as a "public 
service" and "essentially a public utility."  See Appellee's Brf. at 11, 22.  In the 
domestic area, we believe those descriptions are apt.  In some ways, the skepticism 
surrounding the ICM service exists because the program seems antithetical to traditional 
notions of the Postal Service. We expect to pay the same price for a postage stamp as 
everyone else, not to have to bargain for the best rate.  In this sense, the Postal 
                     
0UPS contends the Postal Service never argued before the district court that the President 
consented to the ICM service; thus, UPS claims, the Postal Service has waived this 
argument. Although the Postal Service disputes that it waived the issue, we need not 
decide the question.  We may "review a waived issue under exceptional circumstances," such 
as when the "public interest" so requires.  Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 
117 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993). Because this case involves the 
President's authority to determine the manner of his consent to agency action and the 
validity of more than a century's worth of international postal rates, we hold that 
"exceptional circumstances" exist here.       
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Service is properly compared to a public utility that charges the same rate to all 
customers. 
 But the Postal Service retains its centuries-old monopoly only in the domestic 
market.  In the international arena, Congress has freed the Postal Service from the 
constraints that protect domestic mail rates.  See 39 U.S.C. § 407(a); supra part IV.A.  
Without a monopoly to protect its international business, see 39 C.F.R. §§ 320.6, 320.8, 
the Postal Service now faces competition from UPS and other entities.  See supra part 
IV.B.  Thus, the reasons that may compel a uniform rate for postage in the United States 
no longer apply to large-volume international mailers. 
 In enacting the PRA, Congress repeatedly explained the fundamental reason for 
the dramatic changes mandated by the Act; it wanted the Postal Service to operate less 
like a bureaucratic agency and more like a business.  The relevant committee reports 
repeat this principle again and again.  See, e.g., H.R. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3649, 3660 ("The Postal Service is a public service 
but there is no reason why it cannot be conducted in a businesslike way and every reason 
why it should be.").0 
                     
0See also H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3649, 3650 (The PRA is intended to "[e]liminate serious handicaps that are now imposed on 
the postal service by certain legislative, budgetary, financial, and personnel policies 
that are outmoded, unnecessary, and inconsistent with the modern management and business 
practices . . . ."); id. at 3653 ("Top management must be given authority, consistent with 
its responsibilities, to provide an efficient and economical postal system.  Postal 
management has been severely and unjustly hampered in its efforts to administer the 
Department in a businesslike way."); id. at 3654 (The bill provides "authority to conduct 
the affairs of the Postal Establishment on a business like basis . . . ."); id. at 3665 
("The mandate that the Postal Service must be self-supporting is essential if postal 
affairs are to be conducted with reasonable economy and efficiency."); S. Rep. No. 912, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) ("[P]ostal management must now be given the unfettered 
authority and freedom it has been denied for years to maintain and operate an efficient 
service."); id. ("[T]he laws controlling the governance of the [Post Office] Department 
have become excessively restrictive and [] it is not too soon for a complete break with 
the past."). 
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 While Congress hoped to achieve efficiency in postal operations by enacting the 
PRA, it also sought innovation.  As the House Report noted, the Act "envisions a national 
postal service that is forever searching for new markets and new ways by which the 
communication needs of the American people can be served."  H.R. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3668-69.0  We believe the ICM service constitutes 
an appropriate part of that effort. 
                     
0See also H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3649, 3657 ("The Postal Service is empowered to engage in research and development 
programs directed toward the expansion of present postal service and the development of 
new services responsive to the evolving needs of the United States"); id. at 3668 (The PRA 
"is designed to prevent public service from involving public wastefulness in postal 
matters.  This must be done not only by requiring postal management to operate efficiently 
and economically, but also by requiring it to seek out the needs and desires of its 
present and potential customers -- the American public."); S. Rep. No. 912, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3 (1970) (noting prior postal laws "inhibit[ed] innovation and imagination in the 
management of the Post Office"). 
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V.  
 As a final matter, we consider the proper level of deference to be accorded the 
Postal Service's interpretation of the PRA.  The Postal Service contends its regulations 
are to be given "controlling weight" as long as they represent a "reasonable 
interpretation" of the statute, pursuant to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  We confronted this general issue in 
Courier Conference v. United States Postal Service, 959 F.2d 1213, 1223-25 (3d Cir. 1992), 
and we found Chevron to be controlling. 
 In Air Courier Conference, we considered whether the PRA required the Postal 
Rate Commission to consider any Postal Service change to international rates.  959 F.2d at 
1215-16.  In deciding the PRA did not require it, we noted the Postal Service and the 
Commission agreed that the latter agency played no part in international rate-making.  We 
found the "argument that the Postal Service's bureaucratic bias lessens the need for 
deference is counter-balanced by the express acquiescence of the Commission in the Postal 
Service's view."  Id. at 1225.  As UPS notes, such concurring agency views do not exist 
here. 
 In reaching our decision in favor of the Postal Service, we have been convinced
that Congress intended the PRA to permit the agency to operate more like a private 
business.  See supra part IV.D.  As the Supreme Court has noted, "[b]y launching 'the 
Postal Service into the commercial world,' and including a sue-and-be-sued clause in i
charter, Congress has cast off the Service's 'cloak of sovereignty' and given it the 
'status of a private commercial enterprise.'"  Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 556 (1988) 
(citations omitted).  Because in this case we construe a Postal Service regulation 
explicitly designed to "attract customers that currently use its competitors," see 58 Fed. 
Reg. 29778, 29780, it would appear that a reduced level of deference is appropriate here.  
But we are convinced the ICM service does not contravene the PRA, and so we do not rely on 
any deference that might be due. 
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VI. 
 For the reasons expressed, we will reverse the judgment of the district court.
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